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Foreign Materiel Program (FMP) — DoDD C-3325.01E (October 10, 2006)

The October 10, 2006 Foreign Materiel Program directive assigns DIA executive-agent responsibility and describes acquisition, exploitation, funding, oversight, dissemination, testing, and extraction duties across the Defense Department. This redacted historical edition documents an acknowledged foreign-technology program; it does not identify nonhuman hardware or a UFO recovery operation.

U.S. Department of DefenseDoDD C-3325.01E2006-10-10
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Pages
8
Claims
19
Backlinks
1
Signals
0

Document Intel

Source status, provenance, and extraction context.

Source / agency
U.S. Department of Defense
Type
Document
Classification
Redacted
Reference #
DoDD C-3325.01E
Published
2006-10-10
Content Type
application/pdf
Pages
8

Structured Analysis

Claims and source material extracted from the document text. Timeline context is surfaced in document intel.

AI deep ingest from U.S. Department of Defense.
Claims
Reported by source19
Source reportedConfirmed

The October 2006 directive designates the Director of DIA as the Defense Department executive agent for the Foreign Materiel Program.

Designates the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DlA), as the DoD Executive Agent for the FMP

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive reissues and cancels the February 19, 1998 Foreign Materiel Program directive to update policy and responsibilities.

DoD Directive C-3325.1, subject as above, February 19, 1998 (hereby canceled)

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive defines acquisition as gaining physical possession of, or access to, foreign materiel or technology.

FMP activities that include gaining physical possession of, or access to, an item of foreign materiel or technology.

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive defines exploitation as analysis, testing, evaluation, and documentation of the scientific and technical intelligence characteristics of foreign materiel.

FMP activities that include analysis, testing, evaluation, and documentation

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive includes foreign military systems, commercial items with military potential, technologies, documents, and software within acquisition and exploitation policy.

related technologies, documents, and software to enhance national security.

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive calls for the widest immediate dissemination of exploitation information consistent with need and security, and requires funding through the Defense Department budgeting process.

widest possible dissemination and use to ensure maximum possible benefit consistent with need and security.

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive assigns intelligence leadership control of applicable special access programs through required compartmented procedures.

Control special access programs applicable to the F MP using required compartmented procedures.

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive requires DIA to coordinate program execution and ensure funding for service intelligence centers, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center.

the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, the DIA Missile and Space Intelligence Center, and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive assigns intelligence leadership responsibility for program oversight, congressional contacts, acquisition and exploitation funding, and an annual report to the Secretary of Defense.

Submit a report of DoD FMP activities to the Secretary of Defense by February I of each year.

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive requires DIA to maintain the Foreign Materiel Management System and designate acquisition and exploitation organizations according to intelligence, operational, and test requirements.

Establish and maintain a comprehensive foreign materiel data base (i.e., Foreign Materiel Management System).

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive requires coordination of overt acquisition plans with the Department of State and intelligence leadership, along with annual program reports and plans.

Coordinate OPLANs submitted by the Military Departments for all overt acquisitions with the Department of State

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive gives NSA oversight of acquiring and exploiting foreign cryptologic and cryptographic materiel and information.

Exercise oversight for all matters concerning the acquisition and exploitation of foreign cryptologic/cryptographic materiel and information.

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive requires acquisition leadership to incorporate useful foreign technology and design findings into U.S. weapons and countermeasures.

are incorporated into U.S. weapons and countermeasures systems.

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive requires the Missile Defense Agency to coordinate foreign acquisitions with DIA, report acquisition opportunities, supply quarterly database information, and submit annual planning inputs.

Provide information necessary to maintain the DoD FMP database to the Director, DIA, each quarter.

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive requires operational and live-fire test priorities to be reflected in program planning and implementation.

ensure both the operational and live fire test and evaluation priorities are reflected in the planning and implementation

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive requires military departments to organize, train, and equip forces for exploitation of captured equipment and coordinate its extraction to the United States.

to coordinate and oversee extraction of appropriate equipment to the United States.

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive assigns the Joint Chiefs chairman responsibility for advising on program priorities and representing combatant commands before the steering committee.

Provide advice on FMP priorities.

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive requires combatant commands to prepare acquisition, exploitation, and extraction support during peacetime cooperation, contingencies, and military operations.

peacetime/security cooperation activities, contingency operations, or captured (or otherwise acquired) during military operations.

Source reportedConfirmed

The directive references the 1999 implementation instruction, the Foreign Comparative Testing procedures manual, and directives covering legislative affairs and international agreements.

DoD Instruction S-3325.4, "Implementation of the Foreign Materiel Program (U)," April 15, 1999

Timeline

Chronology extracted from the document text.

October 10, 2006

Foreign Materiel Program directive reissued

DoDD C-3325.01E updates program policy and responsibilities, designates DIA executive agent, and takes effect immediately.

February 19, 1998

Earlier program directive issued

The 2006 directive identifies the February 19, 1998 version as its predecessor and cancels it.

Source material
Redacted October 2006 Foreign Materiel Program directive
documentPrimary
Department of Defense, DoDD C-3325.01E, October 10, 2006; official FOIA reading-room copy, eight pages.Source link

Referenced In Coverage

Investigative posts, source items, and other coverage that currently cite this document.

UAP Gerb
▶8h agoindependent

Probed ingest of: NASIC - Air Force UFO Crash Retrieval & Reverse Engineering

UAP Gerb traces NASIC's foreign-technology mission and argues that selected analysts, geospatial teams, and engineering organizations participate in concealed UFO recovery work. The investigation brings together David Grusch's remarks, the Foreign Materiel Program, Immaculate Constellation, Leonard Stringfield's witness accounts, and the Blue Room paper trail. Official records, disputed historical material, and Gerb's proposed identities and locations are distinguished throughout.

reverse engineeringOpen postOriginal item