The Remote Viewing & Stargate Program refers to a U.S. intelligence-funded initiative in which psychic or “remote viewing” techniques were researched, developed, and occasionally deployed. Beginning in the early 1970s, this line of inquiry was managed under Stanford Research Institute (later SRI International), and funded by agencies such as the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Its ostensible purpose was to test whether individuals could, without sensory input, perceive distant or hidden information in ways that might aid espionage or strategic decision-making. It matters because it represents one of the few documented attempts by the U.S. government to formalize psychic phenomena into an intelligence asset—its successes, internal debates, and ultimate termination provide a case study in how unverifiable claims are managed in classified scientific programs.

In its verified phase, the program comprised two main tracks. First, research protocols at SRI and elsewhere investigated whether remote viewing yields above-chance accuracy under controlled laboratory conditions. Physicists such as Harold Puthoff and Russell Targ were central to that work. Second, operational applications were assigned to viewers to attempt intelligence tasks like locating downed aircraft, identifying enemy installations, or finding missing persons.

These would be classified, mission-oriented assignments.

Reported or attributed claims include:

• Viewers reportedly located Soviet nuclear test facilities or correctly described specific foreign airfields based only on geographic coordinates.
• Remote viewers like Joseph McMoneagle later claimed dozens of operations in which they provided intelligence otherwise unavailable through conventional means.
• Some believe the program played roles in locating Scud missiles during the Gulf War and identifying certain underground facilities abroad.

However, numerous criticisms and contestations have been documented. Evaluations—most notably a CIA-commissioned retrospective review by the American Institutes for Research in 1995—found that while remote viewing occasionally scored statistically above chance under lab settings, no case was verified where remote viewing information provided reliable, actionable intelligence guidance in an operational setting. The report recommended terminating the program on that basis. Other analysts have flagged methodological flaws: poor control over sensory leakage, retrospective fitting of claims, vague descriptions, and low replicability.

Open questions persist: Was the occasional statistical anomaly meaningful, or merely noise? Did classification protect flawed results? Could methodological innovations salvage any residual signal? The program ceased in 1995, leaving behind a body of declassified documents, divergent interpretations, and enduring debate over what, if anything, was truly achieved.