CIA-UAP-003: The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2…

The CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program lasted 20 years.

The Agency's manned overhead reconnaissance program lasted 20 years.

The U-2 was an enormous technological success.

The U-2 was an enormous technological success.

President Eisenhower forbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR after the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on 1 May 1960.

After the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on 1 May 1960, President Eisenhower forbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR.

The U-2 project was authorized by President Eisenhower in late 1954.

It began with President Eisenhower's authorization of the U-2 project in late 1954.

The A-12 OXCART program was canceled in 1968.

The program was canceled in 1968 after the Air Force deployed a fleet of similar aircraft.

Recalled to active duty by the Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the Reconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Air Development Command at Dayton, Ohio, in April 1951.” * Richard S.

Recalled to active duty by the Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the Reconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Air Development Command at Dayton, Ohio, in April 1951.” * Richard S.

et fOR ORAL —— Chapter 1 8 The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft With interest in high-altitude reconnaissance growing, several Air Force agencies began to develop am aircraft to conduct such mis- sions.

et fOR ORAL —— Chapter 1 8 The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft With interest in high-altitude reconnaissance growing, several Air Force agencies began to develop am aircraft to conduct such mis- sions.

Burrows’s broader work suffers more from the lack of classified documentation, particularly in the OXCART/SR-7I section, which concentrates on the Air Force air- craft because little information about the Agency’s aircraft has been officially declassified and released.

Burrows’s broader work suffers more from the lack of classified documentation, particularly in the OXCART/SR-7I section, which concentrates on the Air Force air- craft because little information about the Agency’s aircraft has been officially declassified and released.

Air Force orders for variants of the CIA’s A-12— the YF-12A interceptor and the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft—had helped lower development and procurement costs for the OXCART.

Air Force orders for variants of the CIA’s A-12— the YF-12A interceptor and the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft—had helped lower development and procurement costs for the OXCART.

The mission photography was excellent, but it did not provide intelligence on Soviet ICBMs, which were tested at Tyuratam, not Kapustin Yar.” Because there had been so few overflights in 1958 and 1959, many questions about the Soviet missile program remained unan- swered.

The mission photography was excellent, but it did not provide intelligence on Soviet ICBMs, which were tested at Tyuratam, not Kapustin Yar.” Because there had been so few overflights in 1958 and 1959, many questions about the Soviet missile program remained unan- swered.

—SEtrev WOFORTT Chapter 5 220 | Recovery of Article 349, April 1960 The publicity generated by the U-2 incident stirred considerable controversy in Japan, and there were soon demonstrations against the continuing presence of U-2s in Japan.

—SEtrev WOFORTT Chapter 5 220 | Recovery of Article 349, April 1960 The publicity generated by the U-2 incident stirred considerable controversy in Japan, and there were soon demonstrations against the continuing presence of U-2s in Japan.

One argument that helped overcome the President’s reluctance was the CIA’s longstanding contention that U-2 flights might actually go undetected because Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft at such high altitudes.

One argument that helped overcome the President’s reluctance was the CIA’s longstanding contention that U-2 flights might actually go undetected because Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft at such high altitudes.

Air Force radar order-of-battle reports and NSA studies had revealed that the radar network in the Soviet Far East, with antiquated radar sets and personnel of a lower caliber than those in the western Soviet Union, was relatively ineffective.

Air Force radar order-of-battle reports and NSA studies had revealed that the radar network in the Soviet Far East, with antiquated radar sets and personnel of a lower caliber than those in the western Soviet Union, was relatively ineffective.

From the _ very beginnings of the U-2 program in 1954, the Agency and the Air Force were partners in advancing the state of the art in overhead re- connaissance.

From the _ very beginnings of the U-2 program in 1954, the Agency and the Air Force were partners in advancing the state of the art in overhead re- connaissance.

Secret Nororn— Chapter 2 61 project—the construction and testing of the aircraft—remained the ex- clusive province of Lockheed.” As a result of this agreement, CIA remained in control of the program, but the Air Force played a very important role as well.

Secret Nororn— Chapter 2 61 project—the construction and testing of the aircraft—remained the ex- clusive province of Lockheed.” As a result of this agreement, CIA remained in control of the program, but the Air Force played a very important role as well.